Transcultural communication: What can it offer?

A dialogue in spite of cultural differences in Lithuania, Czech Republic and Cyprus

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ABSTRACT:
Transcultural communication is of great importance in situations when cultures and ethnicities clash. Of three selected cases from 20th century Europe (the extermination of Lithuanian Jews, the violent expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans and the killings of Turkish Cypriots), the author identifies the basic conditions under which a transcultural dialogue is possible. These include, for example, the obligation not to remain silent, suspension of truth, clôtural reading of history, rejection of collective guilt, and the political relevance of transcultural dialogue.

ABSTRAKT:
Transkulturní komunikace má zásadní význam v situacích, kdy hrozí etnický či kulturní střet. Na třech vybraných příkladech z dějin Evropy 20. století (vyvraždění litevských židů, násilný odsun československých Němců a pogromy na turecké Kypřany) autor identifikuje základní podmínky umožňující transkulturní dialog. Mezi ně patří například povinnost nemlčet, pozdržení soudu o pravdě, interpretace historie z perspektivy oběti, odmítnutí principu kolektivní viny a politická relevance transkulturního dialogu.

1) From now on, exclusively the term transcultural will be used to label the desired quality of dialogue among people with different cultural backgrounds.

2) "We do not remain what we were" (Gadamer 1975, as cited in Zene 2001: 105).

3) The word clôture in French is translated as closure in English. Clôtural reading of history can be thus understood as an outcome of the aforementioned effort to dwell on the border / at the threshold / in the liminality, suspending (closing out) the claim to truth.

4) If I am not mistaken, the Jews themselves prefer the Hebrew term shoah (meaning "catastrophe", which means "total burnout" and stems from the Greek. Transcultural communication can only take place if all the parties mutually respect their linguistic preferences. We can hardly achieve a transcultural understanding if we continue using e.g. the term "Eskimo" (stemming from the French, meaning "a raw meat eater") instead of "Inuit" (a native and neutral term, meaning "more than one person"), "black" instead of "Afroamerican" etc.

5) For an authentic source of information see Sakowicz 2005..

6) Burda himself argues for the mimetic theory and the scapegoat mechanism introduced by the French-American literary critic and philosopher René Girard.

7) Truska (2006) presents well-grounded arguments against the lie about Jewish pro-Sovietism. This debate refers to the so-called "double-genocide theory, [...] according to which Lithuanian participation in the Holocaust should be explained as a response to Jewish participation in the sovietization of Lithuania during 1940–1941 and in the deportation of Lithuanians to Siberia in June 1941" (Bartasevičius 2006: 388).

8) The fact that the killers usually became drunk before they started to perform their abhorrent tasks and that they sometimes had a criminal past does not at all provide us with an explanation of the events. Alcoholics and violent criminals have always been part of society, but not always do they participate in a genocide.

9) On this occasion I would like to relate an anecdote from the Kaunas University of Technology where I held lectures in February 2013. I assigned the students, most of whom were studying social education, the question „What

10) See the eponymous excerpt from an article written by an American historian with Lithuanian origins Saulius Sužiedėlis (2006).

11) See the polemics in their breadth in the volume edited by Levinson (2006), pp. 394-408.

12) May this text be a late reply to a comment I found in the evaluation forms of my lectures held in Kaunas in 2013: „The lectures were good but I don't understand why we had to talk so much about Jewish people."

13) During the war, some parts were annexed to the Third Reich, some were governed as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and some existed as a client state of the Nazi Germany under the name of the Slovak Republic.

14) The transfers continued

happened to the Jews who lived in Lithuania before WWII?" We wrote their collective answer on the whiteboard: „They were killed by the Holocaust organized by the Germans." Please note the passive voice, the anonymity of guilt, the silence about the Lithuanian role, and the delegation of responsibility. It took us some time to amend the answer to the following statement: „Concrete, individual German and Lithuanian perpetrators killed them."

occasionally even after 1946. By 1949, the expelled newcomers numbered about 11 million (Hahnová 2012). Some sources speak about 12 (Krauss 2010) or even 14 (Douglas 2012) million by 1950, almost 2 million of them settled in Bayern.

15) In addition, about 5,600 local Germans committed suicide in 1945 (Arburg & Staněk 2010b).

16) The position of ethnic minorities in the newly created nation states in Central Europe was rather weak and they were poorly protected, which contributed to a growth in their nationalistic tendencies (Staněk 1991).

17) In 1945, Europe stood on the verge of a Cold War and ethnic cleansing of the future client states of the Soviet Union was very much in Stalin's interests.

18) Brügel (2008) criticises German journalists and historians, claiming that the Czechs paid the Germans back for their war atrocities with equal mistreatment.

19) The president, Edvard Beneš, stated that "we must not hold on to an unrealistic hope that it will be possible to destroy or exterminate 3 million Germans, as several among us naively claim" (Beneš 1940, as cited in Glassheim 2000: 471, my italics).

> *"For many people it is depressing even to move house. To know that one will never again find a decently human habitation, never again sit down to a proper table. Yet this is all nothing. To be more shackled than any convict. To be counted as outside the law, a vagabond, whom anyone has the right to kill unpunished."*
> Franz Werfel, The Forty Days of Musa Dagh

NOT TO REMAIN WHAT WE WERE: AN INTRODUCTION

In 2014, we commemorate the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of WWI. The 20th century witnessed much hatred and violence among different cultural and ethnic groups and we might wish such animosities would never happen again, yet we can hardly consider the wounds of the past to have healed – take the current crisis in Ukraine as an example. Speechlessness before the incomprehensible Other, a silence of words accompanied by the rattle of weapons, such are the symptoms of a transcultural dialogue that has failed.

On the following pages, we shall focus on the topic of transcultural communication and its importance in contemporary society. Three specific cases will be presented as illustrations of transcultural failure: the mass murder of Lithuanian Jews during WWII, the violent expulsion of Germans living in Czechoslovakia after the Second World War had ended, and the Cypriot conflict that escalated in the 1970s and led to a tense international situation on the divided island that has persisted to this day. The reason for cho-

osing these episodes in recent European history and not others is subjective; I spent short periods of time as a visiting professor in Lithuania and Cyprus in 2012 and 2013, and my objective is to analyze controversial issues in the 20th century collective memory of small European nations, to which the Czechs, Lithuanians and Cypriots certainly belong.

Academic writing on the theme of transcultural communication is manifold, yet usage of the term, often substituted by 'cross-cultural' and/or 'intercultural',[1] is far from being universally consistent. Luckmann-'s work (1999) is an example of a relatively common context in which the expression is evoked – nursing practice where communication with people of varied cultural origins is necessary. The particular focus of Luckmann's textbook is beyond our interest, yet the importance of perceiving others first "as individuals with unique experiences and expectations, and then as members of different cultures" (Luckmann 1999: 18) is valid for our analysis, too. Another field that focuses on communication across cultures is management and international business. Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars (2000) study the usual dichotomies in values and attitudes (such as individualism versus communitarianism), first described by Hofstede (1980). Again, Hampden-Turner's & Trompenaars's field of study is only vaguely related to ours, yet we can agree with their opening observation that "foreign cultures are not arbitrarily or randomly different from one another. They are instead mirror images of one another's values" (Hampden-Turner's & Trompenaars 2000: 1). We could continue listing other areas where cross- or inter-cultural communication plays an important role, such as technical communicati-

on (Warren 2006) or public relations (Carayol & Frame 2012), but these environments would lead as astray. We shall rather concentrate on the study of transcultural dialogue from an ethical perspective and avoid, at least temporarily, definitive solutions.

A valuable source of inspiration for the following pages will be the essay by Cosimo Zene (2001), a British-Italian anthropologist and expert on religious studies, in which he formulates his understanding of dialogue with an Other in the light of Bakhtin's, Gadamer's, Levinas's and Gramsci's thought. First of all, Zene reminds us that dialogue has become a magic formula in cultural and social anthropology, masking the old dominance of the ethnographer over the Other with pretentious good will. If anthropology is to foster a real dialogue, it has to reflect deeply on its philosophical connotations.

And what is it actually – a real dialogue? "A speech across, between, through two people. It is a passing through and a going apart. There is both a transformational dimension to dialogue and an oppositional one – an agonistic one. It is a relationship of considerable tension" (Crapanzano 1990, as cited in Zene 2001: 96). Entering a dialogue thus involves an inner change for all the participants, including the Western anthropologist,[2] and it is a risky endeavour that may not succeed. Accepting the fact that we cannot control beforehand the outcomes of a dialogue answers the question whether dialogue is "an end in itself or a means to a different end" (Murray 1991, as cited in Zene 2001: 99). Transcultural dialogue is not intended here as a method or an instrument that is supposed to generate solutions. It is rather a rupture in space and time, in which the Levinasian face of the Other

"teaches me to be myself in spite of myself" (Zene 2001: 110).

For our analysis of the three selected issues that are part of European history, three points made by Zene will be crucial. One, a transcultural dialogue cannot give up the search for truth completely, yet it must be held within a specific climate of openness: "Only when truth is suspended and the Other welcomed is there a chance to discover the intensity of a project--discipline called anthropos-logia, where the logos is not the violent reductio ad unum of Greek philosophy but takes into account the diversity of positions even within European thought vis-à-vis Otherness, as well as the presence of "Others" within Europe itself" (Zene 2001: 97). This requirement for a suspension of truth is similar to Claudio Baraldi's (2003) call for the courage to reside at a dangerous threshold, while this threshold looks like a non-place, a space where the differences between the meeting subjects can be put in parentheses.

Two, when studying historical failures of transcultural dialogue, the so-called clôtural reading[3] is a useful method. Simon Critchley, an English thinker specializing in Derrida's philosophy of deconstruction, coined the term meaning "history read from the standpoint of the victims of that history" (Critchley 1992, as cited in Zene 2001: 113), thus history that is aware of its ethical aspect.

And three, the route is not completed with the step from cultural and philosophical anthropology over history to ethics. It is hence impossible to turn a blind eye to politics. "The passage from ethics to politics in anthropology is complicated and problematic, [...] but necessary, if we do not want to run the risk of fos- ▶

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▶ tering a discipline which promotes a-political quietism and keeps "a murderous silence in front of the dying face of the Other"" (Zene 2001: 115). This text is by no means written as a political manifesto, yet its conclusions will inevitably touch upon political issues related to the phenomena in question.

Let us now concentrate on the actual topic of the paper, i.e. the unhealed wounds of Lithuanian, Czech and Cypriot society. The main research question reads as follows: What can the perspective of transcultural communication add to the debate about the extermination of Lithuanian Jews in 1941, the violent expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans after 1945 and the massacres of Turkish Cypriot civilians in the 1960s and 1970s? Do these events have any common characteristics that have determined their transcultural failure? It ought to be remembered that "applying an ethical-dialogic interpretation, both as a theoretical orientation and as a methodological "tool", the writer can never, no matter how much he/she wishes, have the final "concluding" word" (Zene 2001: 118). Without aspiring to present definitive answers, we shall now take a closer look at the selected cases.

THE UNHEALED WOUNDS OF LITHUANIAN, CZECH AND CYPRIOT SOCIETY

The aim of our analysis is not an objective historical description of particular events, bearing in mind the theorem of clôtural reading that rejects the doctrine of so-called objective historical facts. Our focus is a cultural, or more precisely a transcultural understanding of these dramatic defeats suffered by humanity. It is important not to overshadow the aspect of self-reflexivity: thinking about these tragic episodes is useless when made from a safe mental and moral distance. As Davis puts it, "to get close to relevant cultural information […], we have to stretch our own boundaries, our conceptions of reality, and our expectations and beliefs. […] It is an exercise of our own humanity, pushing and pulling all that we take for granted in our mental, physical and emotional make-up" (Davis 2011: 4-5). To achieve transcultural comprehension means that all of us, myself and my readers included, must accept some personal involvement since we belong to the same human species. It is necessary to identify both with the victims and with the perpetrators, and to come to terms with the fact that past atrocities and persecution of the Other are not an anomaly but rather a characteristic of culture (Burda 2013).

The extermination of Lithuanian Jews in 1941-1944
We do not know the exact numbers of Jews living in Lithuania before the outbreak of WWII, nor the Jewish victims of the Lithuanian shoah. Most probably (Snyder 2013; Mrázková 2011; Bubnys 2005) there were more than 200,000 and fewer than 250,000, out of which more than 160,000 but fewer then 230,000 were killed during the years 1941 and 1944, thus 85-96% of the total Jewish population. Mrázková (2011) describes the course of the events in Lithuania as follows: In the first phase (within a mere 6 months in 1941), two thirds of all Lithuanian Jews were killed. Men were in most cases shot, but it was not an exception for wounded women and children to be thrown into the pits alive.[5] The initiative was led largely by the so-called Einsatzgruppe A, with the worst massacres taking place in the forest of Paneriai (Ponary) and at the Ninth Fort in Kaunas. In the second pha-

se (1941-1943), those who survived were exploited as forced labourers, suffering from maltreatment and dying in occasional mass executions. The third phase (1943-1944) included the transformation of ghettos into concentration camps, mass murders of the sick and weak, and transports to camps elsewhere in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and the Third Reich. The annihilation of Lithuanian Jews was extremely quick and efficient thanks to the readiness of ethnic Lithuanians to collaborate with the Nazis (Bubnys 2005).

First of all, when trying to unearth the causes of the slaughter, we have to resist the temptation to barricade ourselves behind the mixed feelings of horror and awe, detaching our life from the lives of "Them". We are obliged to speak in the face of terrible crimes committed by human beings, not to remain silent (Galimberti 2013). What were the reasons for the horrific mass murders of men, women and children, literally eliminating Lithuanian Jewry from the occupied country?

To explain the extermination of Lithuanian Jews that would not have been possible, or at least not as fast and as brutal, if ethnic Lithuanians had not been ready to assist, we can approach the phenomenon from several perspectives. Burda (2013) presents two schools of thought – functionalist and intentionalist. According to the former, economic and social reasons were decisive; according to the latter, it was Nazi ideology that fuelled the genocide.[6] Mrázková (2011) tries to find the answer to two questions: who issued the orders and how exactly did ethnic Lithuanians participate in the killings. How the Lithuanian shoah is narrated and explained is thus of great importance, especially to the Lithuanians themselves, but also to the international community (Budryte 2013).

We can speculate about the image of Jewish people in Lithuania at the beginning of the 1940s. As in many other European countries, it was an influential and wealthy ethnic group whose members often belonged to the country's intelligentsia in numbers disproportionate to their percentage of the overall population. In addition, it was a "homeless" ethnic minority with strong cosmopolitan tendencies, which in the eyes of the Lithuanians turned the Jews into vile communists who welcomed Soviet occupation of Lithuanian territory. It might be partially true that the Jews sensed the danger of the Nazi ideology and hoped for Soviet protection,[7] but it was a vain hope indeed; the number of Lithuanian Jews transported, persecuted and murdered by the Soviet regime was disproportionally higher in comparison with the overall number of Lithuanians affected (Snyder 2013). Furthermore, the pre-war nationalist discourse in Lithuania seemingly corresponded with the presumed goal of the Third Reich – independence for racially pure states. (It is unnecessary to remind the reader that this was not the case at all.) Mrázková (2011) lists five explanations for Lithuanian participation in the killings: 1) the executors were often drunks and criminals; 2) it was an act of revenge on "pro-Soviet" Jews; 3) a completely new geopolitical situation arose, in which the interests of ethnic Lithuanians and Lithuanian Jews were contradictory; 4) it was a result of deeply rooted anti-Semitism, which could be easily expressed within the then presiding state of disorder; and 5) in the pre-war period, a fascist and nationalistic discourse was formed and flourished when the Germans invaded the country.

All of these hypotheses can be labelled as either functionalist (geopolitical situation, conflicting inte-

20) A recent example of such effort may be Kalckhoff's publication (2013) focusing on the case of Postoloprty.

21) Gibbons (1997) even uses the term genocide to describe the "planned extermination" of the Turks of Cyprus. Stephen (2011: 34) quotes the Daily Express issue of 28th December 1963: "We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish Cypriot Quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too frightful to be described in print. Horror so extreme that the people seemed stunned beyond tears."

22) I recollect an interview with a Greek Cypriot originally from

Famagusta, with whom I spoke in April 2012. The woman had tears in her eyes when talking about her father who would never cross the Green Line (the border between the two divided areas that is part of the United Nations Buffer Zone, passable since 2003) because seeing his house inhabited by the Turks would break his heart. "They've raped our homes," she said. Among recent publications on the topic of Greek Cypriot homes lost in the north and mentally never abandoned, see Dikomitis 2012. A feeling of injustice and have been wronged is strong on the Greek Cypriot side.

23) Materials published by Turkish governmental bodies (such as Genocide in 1974 1974)

24) Even the term "ethnic cleansing" is somewhat misleading. As Bell-Fialkoff (2003) observes, the word „cleansing" is an improper euphemism since it evokes water and soap but when applied to human populations, it rather implies refugees, deportations, jail, suffering and death.

25) "[…] A Greek soldier yelled at the woman, […] (Gibbons 1997: 468)."

26) "[…] M. Paškevičius shot at her with a pistol, […] Then Šopys let go a series of shots at the little child. […] (Latvytė-Gustaitienė 2006: 66-67)."

27) Klepsch, as cited in Kalckhoff (2013: 333), my translation.

rests) or intentional (anti-Semitism, ideology).[8] And yes, some of the reasons listed above probably counted more, some of them counted less. Yet even if we identify some vaguely rational motives among the Lithuanians to collaborate with the German occupiers, this still does not explain the grisly events of the years 1941-1944. The disturbing question remains the same: Who killed the Jews of Lithuania?[9, 10]

From a transcultural perspective, the barrier between "Us" and "Them", between ethnic Lithuanians and ethnic Jews needs to be torn down. For hundreds of years, Lithuanians and Jews shared the same territory, they all looked upon the lands of Lithuania as their home. Jewish culture was part – and not the opposite – of Lithuanian culture. It is very important not to forget about the suffering of Lithuanians under the Soviet regime and so is not forgetting to count the corpses in order to silence any partner in the dialogue who simply states: "We lost more beloved ones than you did," precisely because it re-erects the barrier dividing the two worlds of ethnicity. Such is the requirement to suspend "truth" at the beginning of the process.

The second step is reading the history from the viewpoint of the victims. According to Burda (2013), the mimetic theory of René Girard asserts that the victim must be recognized as guilty and not as innocent, otherwise the scapegoat mechanism would collapse (as it does in the Gospels). In fact, the opinion that "the Jews themselves caused the catastrophe that befell them while Lithuanians were dragged into the bloody whirl mostly against their own will" (Vildžiūnas 2006: 395-396)[11] is still present in Lithuanian society.

In order to foster a transcultural dialogue, it is crucial to research and collect evidence about concrete events, identifying both the victims and the perpetrators by name. In this way, all the parties have the chance to gain maximum information and contextualize past acts of violence. The history of the Lithuanian shoah does not "belong" to Lithuanian Jews only; it encompasses the Lithuanian people as a whole. After the annihilation of their Jewish fellow citizens, Lithuania can never regain its former cultural complexity. The Lithuanians, be they Jewish or ethnic Lithuanian, were severely oppressed by the Soviets and by the Nazis, and the wounds are common to both. Lithuanians who committed dreadful crimes against their Jewish fellow citizens betrayed their country.

And at the same time, Lithuanians who risked their lives in order to save their Jewish neighbours are heroes never to be forgotten.[12]

Violent Expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans in 1945-1946
It is difficult, if not impossible to count all the victims of an ethnic cleansing, since it often breaks out suddenly and in an intentionally disorganized way. The violent expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans in 1945 was no exception. By the end of WWII, more than 3 million Germans (Glassheim 2000), or, according to other sources (Staněk 1991) up to 3.6 million, lived in those parts of Central Europe which once belonged to Czechoslovakia.[13] Forced relocation of Germans occurred in many other European countries and according to the German census of October 1946, about 9.6 million people who originally lived abroad were made to settle in post-war Germany (Hahnová 2012). These almost 10 million ethnic Germans[14] were deprived of their homes, yet they were among the lucky ones - they survived. Disregarding the deaths of war prisoners in the Soviet Union, about 100,000 Germans died after the war had ended, of which at least 30,000 tragically lost their lives in Czechoslovakia (Glassheim 2000; Hahnová 2012).[15]

Just as in the case of the Lithuanian Jews, historians divide the period into several phases. The most inhumane events happened immediately after the liberation in May 1945 and in the following summer months during the so-called "wild transfer", in which men, women and children died in death marches, concentration camps, executions and massacres. Ethnic Czechs acted extremely cruelly in the Brno Death March, during events in Ústí nad Labem, Žatec, Postoloprty and elsewhere (Arburg & Staněk 2010b). More organized transfers involving the expulsion of about 2 million Germans took place in 1946.

Historical analyses (Arburg & Staněk 2010a; Brügel 2008; Glassheim 2000; Staněk 1991) present a range of mostly functionalist causes that led to the ethnic cleansing of the Czech lands after WWII: 1) a complex political and ethnic situation in Central Europe already apparent in the 19th century; 2) the behaviour and attitudes of Germans living in the Czech lands and their leaders after the end of WWI,[16] in the 1920s and 1930s, and during the war; 3) oppression and injustice during the wartime years; 4) the political revival of the expulsion plan that was supp- ▶

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osed to guarantee democracy and peace in Europe; 5) the chaotic situation immediately after the liberation and the reluctance of foreign military powers[17] to prevent the escalation of violence; 6) scarcity in provisions and housing after the war; and 7) Czech nationalist radicalism, popular anger, calls for revenge and anti-German propaganda (e.g. the Werewolf danger).

It would be an exaggeration to classify the post-war massacres in Czechoslovakia as a German genocide,[18] even though the nationalistic rhetoric of Czech leaders in exile was strongly ideological.[19] The overall circumstances in the summer months of 1945 were highly unfavourable for a transcultural dialogue and neither international nor local authorities showed any interest in fully controlling the unfolding events. As an eyewitness to the killings in Žatec in June 1945 observed, "understanding for the Czech mentality, induced by the condemnation of German behaviour and compassion for the Czech people tormented by the SS, was transformed into deep hatred that will hinder the peaceful coexistence of the two nations for a long time" (Weiss 1945, as cited in Arburg & Staněk 2010b: 234).

Spontaneous reactions to the recollections of witnesses who saw the lynching of German men and women in the streets, bullying and barbaric murders, are of two kinds. Either the acts of violence are justified as an inevitable result of historical development and predictable revenge for the suffering of the Czechs during the war, or they seem shocking and incomprehensible. How could "ordinary people" who had just come through a war with piles of corpses left behind so quickly adopt the methods of the Nazis, persecute, arrest and kill their own neighbours simply because they belonged to the "wrong" ethnic group? Yet none of these reactions helps us understand the phenomenon.

A transcultural dialogue is supposed to overcome barriers of ethnicity and hatred based on the principle of collective guilt. According to Staněk (1991), the violent expulsion and massacres of Germans after WWII caused political, legal, socio-economic, cultural and moral loss on the Czech side. The same, this time related to war crimes, can be said about the German side. From this perspective, it is difficult to declare unambiguously who won and who lost - the unprecedented military conflict and its epilogue was in the first place a human (and not an exclusively Czech or German) tragedy. Transcultural communication is founded on ethical reflection, which is only feasible when there is enough relevant information about certain events. The imperative of suspending truth is valid, but so is the imperative searching for truth.[20] In other words, truth can only be revealed in a dialogue, not defended a priori.

To read the history of 1945-1946 in the Czech lands from the viewpoint of the victims means completely rejecting the ethnic criterion. The number of victims exceeds the number of perpetrators many times over and in plenty of cases the names of both the murdered and the murderers are unknown, yet it is still important not to imagine two anonymous crowds. Generalisation of the victims and their murders leads to ethnically biased judgements, and the essence of such thinking is equivalent to the black-and-white thinking that triggers the victimisation mechanism with its violent climax. Probably the most obvious political consequence of transcultural dialogue

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on any given topic is the simple willingness to stop its tabooisation.

Massacres of Turkish Cypriot civilians in the 1960s--1970s and the division of Cyprus
The image of a divided Berlin with its wall stirs emotions and operates as a powerful symbol. A city torn apart, with people living next to each other and yet unable to communicate, and in two worlds that are both intimately close and extremely distant. It is peculiar that only a few people are aware of the fact that there is another capital city of an EU Member State which suffers from a similar distortion as you have read here.

Over the last 1,000 years, Cyprus has never been an ethnically homogeneous island. In 1960, about 78% of the population was Greek Cypriot and about 18% Turkish Cypriot, with the latter first appearing in the 16th century after the Ottoman conquest (Ker-Lindsay 2011). Nowadays, the ratio is about 75% Greek Cypriot to 10% Turkish Cypriot, even though data about the population in the northern part of the island is incomplete (Souhrnná teritoriální informace Kypr 2012).

In the past, periods of relatively peaceful coexistence were interspersed with episodes of tension (Fryštenská 2013; Bell-Fialkoff 2003; Hradečný 2000) and the situation deteriorated substantially when Great Britain withdrew from its former colony and Cyprus became independent. In the years 1963-1964 and later in 1967 and 1974, violence and hatred escalated in a conflict with a clear ethnic background. Homes and businesses and above all lives were destroyed on both sides, but Turkish Cypriot victims outnumbered Greek Cypriots. During the first outburst of violence directed against Turkish Cypriot civilians, including women and children,[21] in 1963-1964, about 800 people were murdered or injured (Stephen 2001). Since 1974, about 37% of the island (the north and north-eastern parts) has been under Turkish occupation, as seen from the perspective of international law. In a country with less then 1 million inhabitants, about 150-200 thousand Greek Cypriots were forced to leave their homes and move to the south, about 45-48 thousand Turkish Cypriots were obliged to settle in the northern part of the country, and about 1,400 people are still missing (Miltiadou 2011; Fryštenská 2013). The trauma of failed communication across ethnic and cultural boundaries is vivid and it plays a constitutive role for Greek Cypriot identity (Roudometof & Christou 2011).

In order to identify the causes of the atrocities of 1963-1964 and further unsuccessful attempts to pursue a programme of ethnic cleansing (in the sense of eliminating the Turkish element on the island) in 1967 and 1974, historians and political scientists use mostly functional and partially intentional argumentation. Without wishing to present a complete list, we can name the following: 1) long-lasting tension between the desire of Greek Cypriots to reunify with Greece (the so-called "enosis") and the Turkish Cypriot preference for division of the country based on ethnic criteria (the so-called "taksim"); 2) Turkish Cypriot rejection of the constitutional amendment proposed by Makarios III in 1963, the result of which would have been a substantial restriction of Turkish Cypriot political power in the newly independent country; and 3) Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ethnocentric propaganda and terrorism.

If we want to read the history of the Cypriot conflict from the victims' perspective, we first have to decide who its victims are.

The so-called "Cyprus problem" or "Cyprus question" is of great complexity because the massacres and mutual expulsions took place only several decades ago and eyewitnesses and survivors are still alive. The first condition of transcultural communication - suspension of truth - is paramount, yet in the Cypriot conflict it is particularly difficult to achieve.[22] Again, to suspend the truth does not mean to trivialize crimes against humanity, such as the murders of Turkish Cypriot civilians, including newborn babies bulldozed into mass graves.[23] In the Cypriot case, it rather signifies the necessity to stimulate interest in how the other side was treated in reality; in other words, Greek Cypriots ought to enter into the dialogue with maximum information about specific acts of violence provoked and committed by Greek Cypriots, and likewise Turkish Cypriots. A suitable point of departure for the first condition of transcultural communication to be fulfilled is within a Cypriot (and not Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot) identity. As Spyrou (2000) or Philippou (2005) argue, one of the most efficient institutions able to encourage the active construction of such an identity is education.

If we want to read the history of the Cypriot conflict from the victims' perspective, we first have to decide who its victims are. As already stated above, suffering and martyrdom of the Other has to be documented as well as the painful memories of one's own. The victims are those who died and those who lost their dearest ones. Once we have struggled enough to understand their perspective, we may continue to the perspective of those who were made to leave their homes, properties and businesses. It should be emphasised that no generalisation based on the criterion of ethnicity can lead to a clôtural reading of history - a killer's guilt is immense regardless of their ethnic background and so is the trauma of the victims.

The aim of a transcultural dialogue in Cyprus is also to establish a political solution for the current situation. There are voices defending the transformation of the status quo into two officially separate countries (Stephen 2001; Fryštenská 2013) while others are more favourable to reunion within a federal state (Ker-Lindsay 2011). For better or worse, a political outcome stemming from a transcultural dialogue must be a result of mutual agreement and compromise, not a solution dependent on military force.

DON'T TAKE YOUR BELONGINGS, YOU WON'T NEED THEM: A STORY REPEATED OVER AND OVER AGAIN
As Bell-Fialkoff (2003) and Naimark (2006) remind us, the cases of failed transcultural dialogue we have mentioned are not the only stories of ethnic cleansing[24] in 20th century Europe. To name but one, former Yugoslavia is also a tragically rich source for studies of conflicting ethnicities. Each country and each community has its own characteristics and ethnically motivated murders take place under specific historical circumstances. Yet the archive documents, statements of eyewitnesses and memoires of survivors show stunning similarities. Let us have a look at the following excerpts from authentic testimonies. I substituted the names and ethnic labels with the letters XYZ. The deleted information and references are quoted in the footnotes.

"A big crowd was standing in the prison yard and some people were weeping. This baby girl was crying in her mother's arms. A XYZ soldier yelled at the woman, 'If you don't make her stop, we'll shoot her!' The mother pleaded that she couldn't help the child crying. The soldier shot the baby."[25]

"[A woman] was brought to the forest with a baby. The baby clasped firmly the neck of its mother. XYZ shot at her with a pistol, and the woman fell down with the crying baby. It was still alive. Then XYZ let go a series of shots at the little child. The crying stopped."[26]

"Five 14-year-old boys were shot, too. [...] Not with machine guns, but with rifles, until the last one was dead. I still remember that one of them was shot in his neck and with the final beats of his heart, the blood was spraying like a fountain. The boy was screaming and calling his mother for help. His father, sitting three rows next to me, saw everything. One of us went mad, stood up and started to dance."[27]

To think that the lessons have been learned and horrors such as these shall never happen again in Europe is an illusion. It seems that René Girard has correctly recognized violence as the very essence of culture and the scapegoat mechanism as an ever-repeating phenomenon (Burda 2013). Yet what does it mean to agree that culture is inherently violent? Does it imply that dialogue among cultures and ethnic groups cannot be achieved and that transcultural communication is aberrant nonsense?

▶ Human culture has numerous driving forces, often antagonistic. The tendency to blame, marginalize and ultimately to kill the weak is one of them, but so is reciprocity, cooperation and compassion. Aggression releases energy; peace consumes it, that is certain. To build and maintain a heterogeneous community that would regard cultural, social and ethnic differences as an opportunity is extremely difficult and it requires both collective and individual action. Top-down and bottom-up approaches need to be coherent; in other words, politics and the institutions it influences (such as education or science) have to work hand-in-hand with civil society.

Apart from being hard to achieve, peaceful solutions to cultural clashes are also fragile and demand continuous work - spreading information, breaking taboos, investing in inclusive education and platforms for dialogue within the concerned community. One of the most challenging tasks is questioning the barrier between "Us" and "Them". Ethnic identity is powerful, often linked to cultural and national affiliation, and broader geographical identities (Baltic, Central European, Cypriot) have much less emotional appeal compared to our primordial ties.

Nevertheless, to communicate transculturally does not mean denying or neglecting our inherent and early-acquired identities. If a dialogue is to be held, and not parallel monologues, the parties involved need to accept a set of initial conditions. Below I present a list of such conditions as they emerged from the studied cases.

• the obligation not to remain silent
• the suspension of truth
• a reluctance to compare the quantity and quality of suffering

• reading history from the victim's viewpoint
• the unacceptability of choosing between two (or more) forms of violence
• the unacceptability of the principle of collective guilt
• the political relevance of the dialogue

In this way transcultural communication can work as a remedy. As Robert Hanvey, an American specialist on global education, says, "dispelling the strangeness of the foreign and admitting the humanness of all human creatures is vitally important" (Hanvey 1979: 55). The conditions of trancultural dialogue guarantee a change of standpoint, a step toward the Other who is here to tell their story.

All three events that we have briefly discussed - the fate of Lithuanian Jews, Czechoslovak Germans and Turkish (and Greek) Cypriots - resemble each other, but one of their common traits is at the heart of our interest: the victims are denied the right to live a safe life in their home country, they are deprived of their human identity and they belong nowhere. That is why there is no point in packing their belongings before the killers drag them away - the victims lose their names, their faces, their uniqueness, their "being Somebody". And once they become Nobodies, no form of dialogue is possible.

Transcultural communication is a project of an uncertain future. Its main strength is that if its conditions are met, it prevents us from being indifferent and silent "before the dying face of the Other". The question that follows is how and through which channels the concept of transcultural communication should be disseminated. That is an issue beyond the scope of this paper, yet it is of great importance and certain to be further discussed by philosophers, anthropologists, teachers and politicians. •

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Geneze kulturní diverzity a kulturní unifikace mapových stylů

Jak se projevuje kulturní diverzita a kulturní unifikace v rámci mapových stylů na příkladu mentálních map jedinců vybraných kultur

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ABSTRAKT:
Předmětem studie je mapa jako jeden z vizuálních modelů (nejen) reality, která jako taková promlouvá svým obsahem a jazykem. Nahlížíme-li na mapu jako na obraz, je mapa nejen výsledkem více či méně objektivního záznamu prostoru, nýbrž i projevem jedince, resp. kultury, z níž příslušný jedinec pochází. Studie vychází z výzkumu, v rámci něhož byly studovány mentální mapy jedinců vybraných kultur (Česko, západní Evropa, Nová Guinea). Tento výzkum mimo jiné prokázal postupnou kulturní unifikaci mapových stylů a z jeho závěrů je také patrný rozpor kulturní originality a mezinárodních kartografických konvencí, ačkoliv tento fakt neubral, jak se zdá, užitné hodnotě map.

ABSTRACT:
Aim of the study is the map as one of the visual models of (not merely) reality, that speaks its language and content. If the map is seen as an image, it is not only the result of a more or less objective recording of area, but also the expression of the individual, respectively culture, from which the relevant individual comes from. The study is based on research, within which mental maps of individuals of selected cultures (Czechia, Western Europe, New Guinea) were studied. This research has shown, inter alia, a gradual cultural unification of map styles and in its findings is also apparent conflict between cultural originality and international cartographic conventions, although this fact lost none, as it seems, utility value of maps.

Mapa je jedním z vizuálních modelů reality a, jak ukazuje četná mapová tvorba v rámci fantasy literatury, nejen reality. Je-li mapa nahlížena jako obraz, pak promlouvá především svým obsahem a jazykem. V tomto ohledu je navíc mapa nejen výsledkem více či méně objektivního záznamu prostoru, nýbrž i projevem jedince, resp. kultury, z níž příslušný jedinec pochází. Tím se umocněn také sociální aspekt kartografické tvorby, na nějž bohužel poněkud zapomíná současná agenda oboru kartografie, který se tvorbou map zabývá.

Ačkoliv je to primárně člověk, který mapy tvoří (tvůrce mapy) a používá (uživatel mapy), je v poslední době více pozornosti věnováno technologiím tvorby map, práci s prostorovými daty, geoinformačním systémům apod. Jak ovšem trefně poznamenal již před zhruba 25 lety český kartograf Richard Čapek, „uživatele map ale vůbec nezajímá, jaké techniky kartografové při zpracování map použili. Chtějí mapy, které se dají snadno a správně číst" (Čapek 1990: 146). V této souvislosti je vítanou změnou zejména činnost komise Maps and Society, založené v roce 2007 při Mezinárodní kartografické asociaci (Perkins 2008). Přestože se studiem interdisciplinární problematiky kulturních aspektů kartografické tvorby nepřímo v nedávné minulosti zabýval například projekt „History of Cartography" Harleye a Woodwarda (1987), není stále tato problematika v současnosti uspokojivě řešena na komplexní úrovni.

KULTURNÍ SPECIFIKA MAPOVÝCH STYLŮ
V rámci kartografické stylistiky se rozlišují různé kartografické mapové styly (Pravda 1990), které se projevují zejména různými vyjadřovacími prostředky (vázanými na mapový jazyk) a různým mapovým obsahem. Tyto styly do značné míry souvisejí s účelem kartografického díla, nicméně neméně podstatným činitelem je osobnost

tvůrce mapy, u něhož hrají roli věk, pohlaví, vzdělání, sociální postavení a v neposlední řadě i kultura, z níž tvůrce mapy pochází.

Tato studie využívá koncept tzv. kulturních mapových stylů, který si mimo jiné klade za cíl vytvořit určitý interdisciplinární most mezi kulturní antropologii na jedné straně a geografií a kartografií na straně druhé. Vychází z předpokladu, že příslušníci různých kultur vnímají svět universa odlišně. Jestliže je kultura uvažována jako kognitivní systém (Keesing 1974), kdy každá kultura používá různý kognitivní styl, má jiné životní zkušenosti a znalosti, pak by měli příslušníci tvořit rovněž kulturně rozmanité mapy, neboť už samotnou „skutečnost" vnímají a vyjadřují odlišně. Odlišné jsou i strategie a formy generalizace reality jako například selekce či hierarchizace. To mimo jiné znamená, že se v mapovém obsahu s větší pravděpodobností objevuje to, co považuje příslušná kultura za podstatné; mělo by také docházet ke spontánně odlišným strategiím tzv. kartografické generalizace apod.

Dokazují to konečkonců kromě řady jiných také výsledky studie Trentové o vnímání prostoru dětmi z indiánské a ne-indiánské komunity z kanadského města Whitehorse (Trent 1971). Důležité je ovšem rozlišovat individuální vlastnosti map, založené přímo na konkrétním subjektu tvůrce mapy, od kulturně determinovaných vlastností map, vycházejících z kulturní diverzity. Podle Pravdy (2003) by totiž celkem snadno mohlo dojít k záměně a prvky, které by byly přisuzovány kulturně definovanému kartografickému stylu, by mohly být projevem individuálního kartografického stylu, schopností tvůrce atd.

Kulturní mapový styl v sobě spojuje poznatky celé řady dílčích disciplín výše uvedených vědních oborů. Při jeho studiu je využito dvou základních analogií, a to ▶